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Switchers and Sustainers
The Use of Side Issues in the 2008 Financial Bailout Bill
Stephen X. Flynn
Lawrence University

When the House tried to pass the $700 billion bank bailout, the first version of the
bill failed while a week later the second version passed with 58 members of the
House switching their votes in favor of the second version. This paper explains
how Congressional leadership ensured the second bill's passage. With the Hixon
Marshall model on using side issues to manipulate the dimensions of legislative
choice, I find that by amending the first bill with a variety of tax extenders,
mental health parity, disaster relief and the alternative minimum tax patch, leaders
in the House could attract enough votes to pass the bill without compromising on
the primary bailout provisions.

Page 1 of 14

Introduction
On October 3, 2008 the House of Representatives passed a version of the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 1 that contained unrelated tax provisions and extenders, a
week after it rejected a version of the same bill without those provisions. 58 members (33
Democrats and 25 Republicans) switched their votes to YEA on the second bill, ensuring its
passage. Before, during, and immediately following the passage of the bailout, media
commentators derided the bailout’s inclusion of unrelated tax extenders as “pork,” yet the way
Congress included those changes reveals an underappreciated element of coalition building. In
this study I find that using the HixonMarshall model on legislative dimension manipulation,
House leaders attracted votes through attaching side issues to the second bill. In addition, I find
that contrary to what the literature would suggest, the switchers are not exclusively ideologically
moderate voters, but rather are found across the entire liberalconservative dimension.

Literature Review and Hypothesis
Existing literature attempts to explain how leaders in the House pass general interest
legislation through the use of targeted distributive benefits or pork barrel projects (Evans 1994;
Evans 2004). Evans finds that House leaders will attract moderate votes by enticing them with
side payments in the form of targeted benefits for their district, such as highway demonstration
projects in a highway bill and protections for tomato farmers in a free trade bill.
Although pork is widely acknowledged as an effective tool in coalition building, other
literature suggests that the same manipulating effect can otherwise be achieved by expanding the
dimensions of legislative choice by using side issues (Hixon and Marshall, 2007). By adding
policy dimensions to a bill, House leaders can attract votes from moderates without
1

hereinafter referred to as the “bailout”
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compromising on the primary dimension or issue in the bill. My goal is to use a single case study
to test the HixonMarshall model on the 2008 bailout.
I hypothesize that House leaders avoid compromising on the core components of the
bailout and attract additional votes by attaching side issues to the bill. A key assumption is that
ideologically moderate members will be more attracted to the side issues introduced than they
would be to the bill's primary issue. I predict that members who switch their votes due to the
inclusion of side issues will tend towards the middle of the liberalconservative spectrum or
dimension.
In this study the process begins when House leaders propose a $700 billion Wall Street
bailout package. They care deeply about the bill's main purpose: to alleviate the economic crisis
by injecting hundreds of billions of government capital into the unstable banking industry.
However, the majority of members in the House oppose this bill. Some see it as an illegitimate
government intrusion into the banking industry, whiles others view it as rewarding Wall Street
over "Main Street." The bill fails with a deficit of 13 votes. Determined to pass the bailout,
House leadership has two options: either compromise on the core issue in the bill (how to bailout
the financial sector), or amend the bill by attaching to it other unrelated legislation that would
attract moderates who initially voted against the bill. House leadership decides to attach side
issues to the bailout legislation. The maneuver works and 58 members of the House switch their
vote in favor of the 2nd version of the bill.

Data
The data in this case study is found in two major areas: first, which Congressmen switched their
votes, and second, exactly what was added to the second bill to entice them? I find that the two
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big changes to the second bill are an FDIC increase provision, and the Energy Improvement and
Extension Act of 2008, the latter of which will be the focus of this paper.
Earlier in 2008, the House passed the Energy Improvement and Extension Act, 263 to
160, the same bill that would later be added word for word to the bailout. The EIEA, like an
omnibus budget bill, contained dozens of provisions unrelated to each other. All of these
provisions, while part of the larger Energy Improvement and Extension Act, were at one time
individual pieces of legislation that had passed in the House with significant majorities.
Table 1 serves as an illustration of the variety of issues at stake in the EIEA, as well as
the degree to which they were supported. My assumption is that House leadership knew
attaching the EIEA, along with all these popular initiatives, would increase support for the failed
bailout. Now I will explain how I tested that assumption, both with suggestive evidence and
rigorous statistical analysis.
Table 1
Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, included legislation
Paul Wellstone
Alternative
Disaster Tax
Renewable
Bill name
and Pete
Minimum Tax
Relief Act of
Energy and Job
Domenici Mental Relief Act of
2008
Creation Tax Act
Health Parity and 2008
of 2008
Addiction Equity
Act of 2008
H.R. 6983
H.R. 7005
H.R. 7006
H.R. 7060
Bill number
End
Oneyear
Provide tax relief Provides billions
Summary or
discrimination by extension of tax
to federally
of dollars in tax
goal of
health insurance credits to patch
declared disaster credits for
legislation
companies
the Alternative
areas, such as
renewable energy
against those
Minimum Tax
those affected by investments
with a mental
(AMT)
Hurricane Ike
illness.
Passed 37647
Passed 39330
Passed 4194
Passed 256166
Vote
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First Glance Analysis
The question in this paper is, did attaching the EIEA to the bailout cause 58 members of
the House to switch their votes in favor of the second bailout? Some suggestive evidence shows
that they did. The first assumption I make is that by amending the bailout with the EIEA, House
leaders do so to attract the 225 members who voted against the first bailout bill. Of those 225,
112 had previously voted for the EIEA. The second assumption is that voting for the EIEA
would increase your likelihood of switching your vote. Of those 112 voters, 36 (32%) ended up
switching to YEA on the second bailout (out of a total of 58 switchers).

Table 2
First Glance Analysis
Members who voted NAY on the first bailout but
also previously voted for the Energy Improvement
and Extension Act.
The voters above who went on to switch their vote
in favor of the second bailout bill.

112 of 228
49.77%
36 of 112
32.14%

Other suggestive evidence to support my hypothesis comes from the switchers
themselves. After voting for the second bailout, many switchers cited the inclusion of side issues
as a reason for supporting the bill. Rep. Ed Pastor from Arizona’s 4th district, after the bailout
passed, stated in a press release that all the additional tax credits were “critical” to his district
(Representative Pastor). Rep. Mike Conaway from Texas’s 11th district similarly mentioned the
Alternative Minimum Tax relief and the disaster relief in his press release following the second
bailout (Representative Conaway). The highest acclaim poured on side issues came from Rep.
Jim Ramstad, also a switcher. During the debate on the House floor, he only spoke of the
importance of mental health parity, never once mentioning the bailout provisions themselves.
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(Rep. Ramstad) It seemed like Rep. Ramstad supported the side issues more than he opposed the
bailout, which could explain why he switched his vote when mental health parity became a part
of the second bailout bill.

Statistical Analysis
The goal of this paper is to determine whether or not voting for the Energy Improvement
and Extension Act, a bill which House leaders attached to the bailout, would cause a member
who voted NAY initially on the bailout, to switch their vote on the second bill. The dependent
variable in this test is switching one's vote in favor of the second bailout. The predictive value
voting for the EIEA must be compared to that of other independent variables.

Democrat
This independent variable should test the effects of party membership on whether
one will switch their vote.

Ideology
Using the first dimension DNOMINATE scores, a measure of ideology
extensively used in the literature, I test the predictive value of ideology on
whether or not a member was more likely to switch their vote.

District competitiveness
With the public in tepid opposition to the bailout, members in a competitive
district may be more inclined to vote against the bill. The bailout was one of the
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most highly visible votes in recent history, aided by the fact that it concerned an
extraordinary amount of money and took place 5 weeks before an historic and
widely observed presidential election. I will rate district competitiveness by using
data from CQ Politics, a reputable organization capable of making this variable’s
determination based on polling data and other factors.

Foreclosure Rates
I obtained foreclosure rates for each individual member’s district 2. High
foreclosure rates in a member’s district should sway her to vote against the 1st
bailout bill and for the 2nd bill. The first bill was widely seen as helping “Wall
Street” while the second bill included assistance for homeowners, or “Main
Street.” Foreclosure Rates are useful in measuring how members might be
reacting to constituency rather than party pressure.

H.R. 6049: Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008
This bill contained over one hundred billion dollars in tax credits and tax
extenders for businesses and individuals. It also contained mental health parity,
alternative energy tax incentives, alternative minimum tax relief and disaster
relief provisions, the four of which were identical to H.R. 6983, 7005, 7006 and
7060 mentioned in Table 1. The bill passed with 263 votes in favor. Voting for
this bill should predict an increased likeliness to switch one’s vote.

2

The foreclosure rates were obtained from HotPads.com, a home realty website.
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This test calls for binary logistic regression analysis because the dependent variable is
dichotomous. I disregard House members who initially supported the bailout and only test those
who initially voted against it. I set the dependent variable to whether or not a member switched
their vote in favor of the second bailout. 1 represented a switcher, 0 represented a sustainer, a
voter who remained opposed to the bailout on the second bill. The Democratic Party variable and
the roll call vote were set up as dummy variables with 0 meaning "no" and 1 meaning "yes." The
competitiveness variable will assign a competitive district a score of 0 for “competitive”, to 3 for
“safe”.
Results

Independent variable
Democrat
Ideology
Competitiveness
Foreclosure Rate
H.R. 6049
Constant

Table 3
Coefficient Standard Error
.852
1.071
1.224
1.099
.098
.196
1.029
.221
.656
.628
1.378
.885

P value*
.426
.265
.616
.000
.297
.120

Number of observations : 228
Dependent variable : whether a member switched their vote
*The coefficient is considered statistically significant when its P value is smaller than
0.05

The results of the binary logistic regression analysis show the hypothesis to indeed be
correct, that the evidence points to members of Congress switching their vote because of the
addition of the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 to the bailout bill. The results
for the Party affiliation and Ideology independent variables however show that members are less
likely to switch their vote if they are Republican or Conservative. The analysis I conducted
cannot speak to the substantive significance of the findings, in other words, my research only
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confirms that a relationship exists between the dependent variable and these independent
variables but does not comment on the magnitude of those findings. The P value of all the
independent variables save Foreclosure rates were above 0.05 which means I cannot declare with
a standard of confidence that the independent variable is correlated with the dependent variable.
Nevertheless, a positive coefficient for HR. 6049 demonstrates a relationship that is worthy of
reporting.
Ideology forms a key component to the Evans and HixonMarshall models, which depend
on ideological moderates to provide the pivotal votes in a bill’s passage that are cheaper to attract
than more ideologically rigid members. In Evans, moderates care more about the pork than the
ultimate issue in the general interest legislation (Evans 1994) 3. HixonMarshall rely on first
dimension moderates to consider the second dimension issue attractive enough to compromise
their first dimension preferences (Hixon and Marshall 2007) 4. The question for this bill is
whether or not moderates were the targets of the dimensional manipulation, and whether or not
moderates were the ones who switched their votes. I find the answer to both of those questions
both yes and no.
First, from the outset on this bill, ideology appears to negligibly impact members voting
behavior. Figure 1 displays two histograms with a smoothed curve illustrating the distribution of
ideology in the House among both the NAY and YEA voters on the first bill. When party and
ideological effects are strong, NAY and YEA votes will each occupy opposite ends of the
ideological spectrum, but in the case of the bailout, each vote attracts substantial numbers from
each ideological camp. Figure 2 illustrates the ideological distribution of those who switched and

3

Pg. 895 (“[t]he strategy is successful when the distributive benefits that the leaders offer are more important to the
recipients than the policy matters on which they oppose the leaders”).
4
Pg. 84 (“[t]he strategy we describe involves exploiting relatively minor dimensions to attract support from just
enough moderates to pass a bill.”)
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voted for the 2nd bailout. Contrary to what the literature may suggest, the switchers do not
concentrate in the center of the ideological spectrum.
Figure 1
Ideology distribution of NAY (left) and YEA (right) voters on the first bill

Figure 2
Ideology distribution of switchers
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Figure 3 most importantly compares the ideological positioning of switchers and
sustainers by placing each member on the same lefttoright DNOMINATE spectrum, with the
switchers occupying the top line and the sustainers on the bottom line.

Figure 3
This chart illustrates the ideological positions of switchers and who sustained a NAY vote on the
second bill. Those who switched their vote are placed on the top, and those who sustained are placed
on the bottom.

Switched

Ideology  Switchers vs. Sustainers

1.000

0.500

0.000

0.500

1.000

1.500

DNominate

Although the switchers are not concentrated in the middle of the ideological spectrum, as
Figure 3 demonstrates, there may be an alternative explanation for their placement. Only 13
additional votes were needed to pass the first bailout package. Table 4 lists the 13 most moderate
switching members according to their DNOMINATE scores. Had these members been the only
switchers out of the total of 58, then the assumption that House leaders attract moderates with
side issues would remain unchallenged. In a narrow sense, nonmoderates switching their votes
to YEA may have been attracted to the side issues at a level unanticipated by the HixonMarshall
model. I will expand on that idea at the end of the conclusion to this paper.
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Table 4
A list of the 13 most moderate vote switchers, sorted by ideology
District State
Representative
Party
DNOMINATE
1
1
13
27
8
28
5
6
15
29
18
11
9

NV
IA
GA
TX
AZ
TX
AZ
PA
PA
NY
FL
NJ
MI

Berkley, Shelley
Braley, Bruce
Scott, David
Ortiz, Solomon
Giffords, Gabrielle
Cuellar, Henry
Mitchell, Harry
Gerlach, Jim
Dent, Charlie
Kuhl, Randy
RosLehtinen, Ileana
Frelinghuysen, Rodney
Knollenberg, Joe

DEM
DEM
DEM
DEM
DEM
DEM
DEM
REP
REP
REP
REP
REP
REP

0.351
0.328
0.257
0.230
0.215
0.198
0.148
0.284
0.310
0.358
0.396
0.427
0.428

Conclusions and Opportunities
The HixonMarshall model on manipulating legislative dimensions can account for and
explain the behavior exhibited by House leaders and bailout switchers the days following the
failed passage of the bailout. In attaching the Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008 to
the bailout, House leaders could attract additional votes without compromising on the bailout
provisions. To a limited degree, I found that conservative ideology had a negative correlation
with the dependent variable, as the results of the logistic regression analysis show. What is
certain is that the bulk of switchers were not moderates, as the literature might suggest. However,
rather than measuring the first dimension for the purposes of the HixonMarshall model with
ideology, we could imagine that the first dimension in the bailout bill is simply the dollar amount
proposed, rather than any ideological preference. As a hypothetical, if House leaders insist on a
$700 billion bailout, but the majority only accepts up to a $500 billion bailout, then adding a
second dimension might be the only way to attract additional votes without compromising on the
$700 billion amount. This example only serves to illustrate a possible alternative to the

Page 12 of 14

traditional leftright dimension used to compute DNOMINATE scores. Future research may
look into methodologies to create a first dimension for each piece of legislation on a caseby
case basis, rather than always relying on DNOMINATE or other ideological scores to measure
where moderates may be positioned.
On the other hand, the bailout issue may be too new to have been coopted or captured by
a particular ideology. On the House floor preceding the vote on the first bailout bill, Nancy
Pelosi asked, “When was the last time someone asked you for $700 billion?” (Speaker Pelosi,
2008). This rhetorical question reveals how the American people and political institutions
haven’t fully grasped the reality of spending such an enormous amount of money all at once and
in one sector. Further research in public opinion and Congressional politics could measure how
political parties and institutions are dealing with this issue.
Finally, the economic climate at the end of September and beginning of October 2008
may have affected the switchers more than my research can discern. On the morning of Monday
September 29, 2008, the day the House would reject the bailout, the Dow Jones Industrial
Average opened at 11,139. That week on Friday, October 3, 2008, the DJIA opened at 10,483.
Within a week the stock market dropped 656 points, or 5% of its value. News reports were
blaming a $1.2 trillion dollar loss in the economy on the failure of Congress to pass the bailout
(Twin 2008). Future research could attempt to explain exactly how this economic hemorrhage
might have caused members of Congress to change their mind and support the bailout. However,
even if many switchers were influenced by the state of the economy, the House of
Representatives is still an institution where leaders employ tools to pass legislation, and the use
of side issues was certainly a tool that House leaders used in the case of the 2008 bailout.
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